contents table
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)
Article 52

Article 52 — Risk management

  1. CCPs that enter into an interoperability arrangement shall:
    1. put in place adequate policies, procedures and systems to effectively identify, monitor and manage the risks arising from the arrangement so that they can meet their obligations in a timely manner;
    2. agree on their respective rights and obligations, including the applicable law governing their relationships;
    3. identify, monitor and effectively manage credit and liquidity risks so that a default of a clearing member of one CCP does not affect an interoperable CCP;
    4. identify, monitor and address potential interdependences and correlations that arise from an interoperability arrangement that may affect credit and liquidity risks relating to clearing member concentrations, and pooled financial resources.

    For the purposes of point (b) of the first subparagraph, CCPs shall use the same rules concerning the moment of entry of transfer orders into their respective systems and the moment of irrevocability as set out in Directive 98/26/EC, where relevant.

    For the purposes of point (c) of the first subparagraph, the terms of the arrangement shall outline the process for managing the consequences of the default where one of the CCPs with which an interoperability arrangement has been concluded is in default.

    For the purposes of point (d) of the first subparagraph, CCPs shall have robust controls over the re-use of clearing members’ collateral under the arrangement, if permitted by their competent authorities. The arrangement shall outline how those risks have been addressed taking into account sufficient coverage and need to limit contagion.

  2. Where the risk-management models used by the CCPs to cover their exposure to their clearing members or their reciprocal exposures are different, the CCPs shall identify those differences, assess risks that may arise therefrom and take measures, including securing additional financial resources, that limit their impact on the interoperability arrangement as well as their potential consequences in terms of contagion risks and ensure that these differences do not affect each CCP’s ability to manage the consequences of the default of a clearing member.
  3. Any associated costs that arise from paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be borne by the CCP requesting interoperability or access, unless otherwise agreed between the parties.